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Kent McNeil and Kerry Wilkins, “Welcome Home: Aboriginal Rights Law
after Desautel”
Abstract: In R v Desautel, decided April 23, 2021, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
held, for the first time, that an Indigenous community located in the United States, whose
members are neither citizens nor residents of Canada, can have an existing Aboriginal right, 
protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, to hunt a specified area within Canada. 
This will be so, the Supreme Court majority held, where the community can show that it
descends from (is a successor of) an Indigenous community that was present in what is now
Canada at the time of the ancestral community’s first contact with Europeans and that hunting in 
the relevant part of Canada was integral to its way of life at that time. Justices Côté and 
Moldaver dissented. This article analyzes the majority decision, comments on the dissenting 
judgments. and delves into some unresolved issues that will need attention in light of the
decision. They include the status of common law Aboriginal rights, the notion of sovereign 
incompatibility, the optimal way of litigating claims of Aboriginal right, and the impact of the
decision on Aboriginal title claims and the duty to consult.
Richard Lee Desautel, an American citizen, is a member of the Lakes Tribe, one of the
Confederation Colville Tribes (CCT). He resides with other members of the Lakes Tribe on the
Colville Indian Reservation in the state of Washington. He has never lived in Canada.
The Lakes Tribe traces its ancestry to an Indigenous group usually called the Sinixt, whose
traditional territory straddles the Canada/US border from south-central British Columbia to 
Kettle Falls in Washington State. In 2010, Mr. Desautel, acting on instructions from the CCT’s
Fish and Wildlife Director, entered British Columbia legally and shot an elk within traditional
Sinixt territory near Castlegar, B.C., to secure ceremonial meat for his community. He reported 
the kill to the B.C. wildlife authorities. He was charged with two violations under B.C.’s Wildlife
Act: hunting without a license and hunting big game without a guide while a non-resident.1 At
trial, he admitted the essential elements of the offences but asserted an existing Sinixt Aboriginal
right to hunt for food and ceremonial purposes within traditional Sinixt territory in British 
Columbia. The two relevant offence provisions, he argued, infringe that right unjustifiably.
The trial judge concluded that hunting within traditional Sinixt territory for those purposes in 
what is now British Columbia was integral to the distinctive Sinixt way of life at and before their 
first contact with Europeans in 1811, and that the Lakes Tribe is a successor group to the
ancestral Sinixt.2 Ordinarily, this would suffice to establish an existing Aboriginal right, 
recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, that would protect Lakes
 Kent McNeil is a distinguished research professor (emeritus) at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. Kerry 
Wilkins is an adjunct professor at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. We would like to thank Brian Slattery 
and Stuart Rush for helpful feedback on a draft of this paper.
1 RSBC 1996, c 488, ss. 11(1) and 47(a), respectively.




   
   
  
    
  
    
    
  
 
    
  
   
   
   
 
 
   
  
    
    
 
  
    
  
    
   
    
 
 
   
      
    
  
  
   
   
    
  
   
Tribe members hunting within that territory.3 However, the Crown had argued that section 35 
afforded no constitutional protection to the Lakes Tribe because it guaranteed only “the existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada”4 and the Lakes Tribe, residing 
outside Canada, could not qualify as “aboriginal peoples of Canada.” In the alternative, the
Crown submitted, no Aboriginal right could protect Sinixt hunting in their traditional territory 
within B.C. because there was no evidence that any of them had hunted there between 1930 and 
2010, the year Mr. Desautel shot the elk. Finally, the Crown argued in the further alternative, any 
Aboriginal right the Lakes Tribe might have would necessarily include an incidental right to 
cross the international border for hunting purposes. No such right could exist, the argument ran, 
because it would be incompatible with Canada’s power to control and defend the international
border, an essential attribute of Crown sovereignty.
At trial, Judge Mrozinski rejected these arguments. In her view, an Indigenous group that resided 
and engaged in integral harvesting practices in what is now B.C. at the time of first contact with 
Europeans is entitled to the protection of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Sinixt
ancestors of the present-day Lakes Tribe had indeed migrated into the southern (American) part
of their traditional territory in sufficient numbers to achieve recognition as a tribe under 
American law by 1872, but their exodus was not voluntary; “it was a matter of making the best
choice out of a number of bad choices.”5 Moreover, the absence of evidence that Lakes Tribe
members had hunted in B.C. after 1930 was not fatal to Mr. Desautel’s claim to an Aboriginal
right.6 Finally, she observed, it was not necessary to consider the “sovereign incompatibility”
issue because Mr. Desautel had entered Canada legally, without incident, and was not claiming 
an Aboriginal right to cross the international border.7 According to Mrozinski J, therefore, Mr. 
Desautel and the Lakes Tribe have an existing Aboriginal right to hunt for food and ceremony in 
traditional Sinixt territory in B.C. The offence provisions with which he was charged infringed 
that right, and the Crown had failed to justify the infringement. Mr. Desautel was acquitted.8 
On appeal, the B.C. Supreme Court agreed.9 So, on further appeal, did the B.C. Court of 
Appeal.10 On April 23, 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a 7-2 decision (Côté and 
Moldaver JJ dissenting), dismissed the Crown’s final appeal.11 According to Justice Rowe, who 
wrote for the majority, the Crown was correct to insist that only Indigenous groups that qualify 
as “aboriginal peoples of Canada” are entitled to the protection of section 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982.12 But “Aboriginal peoples of Canada under s. 35(1),” the Court held, “are the modern-
day successors of Aboriginal societies that occupied what is now Canada at the time of European 
3 See, in particular, R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 44-46, 55-59 [Van der Peet].
4 Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
5 R v DeSautel, supra note 2 at para 128.
6 Ibid at paras 128-35.
7 Ibid at paras 136-67.
8 Ibid at paras 168-85.
9 R v Desautel, 2017 BCSC 2389.
10 R v Desautel, 2019 BCCA 151 [Desautel (BCCA)].
11 R v Desautel, 2021 SCC 17 at para 22 [Desautel].




   
 
   
 
  
       
   
   
 
 
    
  












    
   
   
    
     
   
    
   
   
  
 
   
contact.”13 On the findings of the trial judge, the Lakes Tribe meets this requirement.14 This, and 
the further finding that hunting for food and ceremony within south central B.C. was integral to 
the ancestral Sinixt way of life at the time of contact, sufficed, in the Court’s view, to establish 
the Lakes Tribe’s entitlement to an Aboriginal right to do so today.15 The Court thought the
border issue, along with several other issues the Crown and other attorneys general raised in their 
Supreme Court submissions (the Crown’s duty to consult, the common law status of Aboriginal
rights, and provisions in modern treaties about non-resident Indigenous peoples, among others) 
could await resolution in subsequent cases in which the facts required decisions about them.
In this article, we discuss the Court’s reasons for the conclusions it reached and some of the
issues that now will require attention in the wake of Desautel – issues that Rowe J identified but
deferred.
Interpretation of “aboriginal peoples of Canada”
The main issue in the Supreme Court was the proper interpretation of “aboriginal peoples of 
Canada” in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35(1) provides that “The existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and 
affirmed.” The two principal judgments agreed that the framers of section 35 never considered 
whether Indigenous groups residing outside Canada could be “aboriginal peoples of Canada,”16 
but differed sharply in their approaches to this issue.
Justice Rowe applied the purposive approach to interpretation of section 35(1) articulated in 
previous cases, especially R v Van der Peet:17 
[T]he two purposes of s. 35(1) are to recognize the prior occupation of Canada by 
organized, autonomous societies and to reconcile their modern-day existence with 
the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over them. These purposes are reflected in the
structure of Aboriginal rights and title doctrine, which first looks back to the
practices of groups that occupied Canadian territory prior to European contact, 
sovereignty or effective control, and then expresses those practices as constitutional
rights held by modern-day successor groups within the Canadian legal order.18 
Aboriginal rights (apart from title and Métis rights19), including the hunting right in Desautel, are
based on the practices, customs, and traditions integral to distinctive Indigenous cultures at the
time of contact with Europeans.20 These rights therefore relate back to Indigenous peoples’ pre-
13 Ibid at para 47. Rowe J acknowledged expressly that “this criterion will need to be modified in the case of the
Métis” but left that modification for another day: ibid at para 32.
14 Ibid at para 48.
15 See ibid at para 62.
16 See ibid at paras 41 (Rowe J), 115, 119 (Côté J). 
17 Van der Peet, supra note 3.
18 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 22.
19 Aboriginal title is based on exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty:
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw]. Métis Aboriginal rights, apart from title (the
test for which has not been determined by the Supreme Court), are based on Métis practices, customs, and traditions
at the time of effective European control: R v Powley, [2003] 2 SCR 207.




   
    






   
     




     
   
   
  
        
    
  
     
       
 
     
   
    
   
 
    




     
 
   
    
     
colonial use of land and resources in their ancestral territories in accordance with their own 
practices and laws. From this, Justice Rowe concluded, rightly in our opinion, that “the scope of 
‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ is clear: it must mean the modern-day successors of Aboriginal
societies that occupied Canadian territory at the time of European contact. As a result, groups
whose members are neither citizens nor residents of Canada can be Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada.”21 Members of the Lakes Tribe of Sinixt people living in Washington State, including 
Mr. Desautel, could therefore have constitutionally-protected rights in their ancestral territory in 
Canada.
Justice Côté dissented on this issue.22 She regarded the majority’s understanding of the meaning 
of “aboriginal peoples of Canada” to be
… contrary to a purposive analysis of s. 35 that examines the linguistic, philosophic, 
and historical contexts of that provision. This Court’s s. 35(1) jurisprudence has
characterized – properly, in my view – reconciliation in terms of the relationship 
between non-Aboriginal Canadians and Aboriginal peoples as full and equal
members of, and participants in, Canadian society.23 
In her opinion, the drafters of section 35 could not possibly have intended the provision to 
include non-resident Indigenous groups.24 
Justice Côté thus considered reconciliation apposite only to the segments of Indigenous nations
that happened to end up and stay in Canada after Britain and the United States drew their
international border in the 18th and 19th centuries.25 These colonial actions bifurcated many 
Indigenous nations, taking no account of their presence on and relationship with their traditional
territories. Côté J’s view would perpetuate these adverse effects, leaving the Indigenous
members of these nations who reside in the United States separated from their homelands and 
relatives in Canada. This would hardly serve the interests of reconciliation. Justice Rowe’s
approach, on the other hand, does promote reconciliation precisely because it takes account of 
the disruptive effects of these insensitive and disrespectful colonial initiatives. It is a step 
towards righting that earlier injustice.
The Van der Peet Integral to the Distinctive Culture Test and Continuity
Establishing that the Sinixt are an Aboriginal people of Canada was a threshold requirement for 
the majority of the Supreme Court. In addition, for Mr. Desautel to have an Aboriginal right to 
hunt for food, social, and ceremonial purposes in their ancestral territory in Canada, the practice, 
21 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 23.
22 Justice Moldaver, in a brief separate dissent, was prepared to assume, without deciding, that the majority’s
understanding of “aboriginal peoples of Canada” was sound. He dissented on other grounds, discussed below. See
ibid at para 143.
23 Ibid at para 94.
24 See ibid at paras 115-25.
25 This was done when neither Britain nor the U.S. actually occupied or exercised authority over most of the territory 
crossed by these borderlines. On creation of the border by bilateral international treaties in 1783, 1818, and 1846, 
see Bruce Hutchison, The Struggle for the Border (Don Mills, ON: Longman Canada, 1955); Norman L. Nicholson, 
The Boundaries of the Canadian Confederation (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979); Donald A. Rakestraw, For





     
    
  
     
 
  
   
  
    
  
   
 
      
   
   
    
   










   
  
  
   
 
    
    
  
     
   
          
      
custom, and tradition of hunting had to be integral to pre-contact Sinixt culture, as required by 
the test created in the Van der Peet case in 1996. Justice Rowe said the test for groups outside
Canada is the same as for groups within Canada and decided that the trial judge had applied the 
test correctly in determining that the Sinixt People have a right to hunt in their ancestral territory 
in Canada. However, he had more to say about the continuity that is required between the
historical practice, custom, and tradition and the modern practice that is alleged to be protected 
as an Aboriginal right, as both Justice Côté and Justice Moldaver dissented on this matter.
Continuity in this sense means only that the modern practice has to be sufficiently like the
historical practice to fall within the scope of the right arising from the practice, custom, or 
tradition at the time of contact.26 But the dissenting judges thought that the continuity 
requirement also necessitates a degree of continuation of the practice over the intervening time
period. Justice Côté, Moldaver J concurring on this issue, opined that, “while temporal gaps in 
the actual practice do not necessarily preclude the establishment of an Aboriginal right (Van der
Peet, at para. 65), failing to tender sufficient evidence that the practice was maintained or, at
least, that a connection to the historical practice was maintained during such gaps may be
fatal.”27 She emphasized the absence in the factual record of any evidence that the Lakes Tribe
had hunted in Canada between 1930 and 2010, when Mr. Desautel shot the elk. In her view, 
“[c]ontinuity cannot be established simply because there is evidence that ‘the land was not
forgotten’ in the minds of the Lakes Tribe members…. A single shot cannot create the Lakes
Tribe’s modern exercise of the right.”28 
The majority understood continuity differently. In one sense, Justice Rowe said it can have a role
in proof. Evidence that
… a practice is integral to the claimant’s culture today, and that it has continuity with 
pre-contact times, can count as proof that the practice was integral to the claimant’s
culture pre-contact…. As Kent McNeil explains, “continuity of this sort has to be
shown only when Aboriginal peoples rely on post-sovereignty occupation or post-
contact practices, customs, and traditions as evidence of their pre-sovereignty 
occupation or pre-contact practices, customs, and traditions.”29 
Another use of the concept of continuity is in the determination of 
… whether the modern practice which is claimed to be an exercise of an Aboriginal
right is connected to, and reasonably seen as a continuation of, the pre-contact
practice. At this stage, continuity with the pre-contact practice is required in order for 
the claimed activity to fall within the scope of the right. It serves to avoid frozen 
rights, allowing the practice to evolve into modern forms…. The right claimed “must
26 See R v Marshall; R v Bernard, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 67 [Marshall/Bernard].
27 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 130.
28 Ibid at paras 136-37.
29 Ibid at para 53, quoting “Continuity of Aboriginal Rights”, Kerry Wilkins, ed., Advancing Aboriginal Claims:
Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2004), 127 at 138. The Court relied as well on Van der
Peet, supra note 3 at paras 62-63; R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 28 [Gladstone]; Delgamuukw, supra 






   
     
  
    
   
   
  
   
  
   
     
   
 
   
  
   
    
 
  
   
    
   
 
      
     
       
     




   
  
    
    
   
  
   
  
be allowed to evolve”, because “[i]f aboriginal rights are not permitted to evolve and 
take modern forms, then they will become utterly useless.”30 
Unlike the dissenting judges, who were concerned about the temporal aspect of continuity, the
emphasis of the majority was thus on the use of the concept to determine the scope of the
contemporary right and the need to include modern ways to exercise it.
The Crown argued that “continuity requires an ongoing presence in the lands over which an 
Aboriginal right is asserted.”31 Justice Rowe responded as follows:
As my discussion of continuity should make clear, this has never been part of the test
for an Aboriginal right. Nor is there any basis for adding it to the test, even where the
claimant is outside Canada. As Lamer C.J. explained in Van der Peet, at para. 65, “an 
unbroken chain of continuity” is not required. Indeed, as McLachlin J. (dissenting, 
but not on this point) noted in Van der Peet, at para. 249, “it is not unusual for the
exercise of a right to lapse for a period of time”.32 
Justice Rowe’s position on this is consistent with common law principles. Legal rights, once
acquired, are not lost through non-user.33 In Re Yateley Common, Justice Foster said this in 
regard to a customary right to a common:
A right of common is a legal right, and it is exceedingly difficult to prove that a
person having such a legal right has abandoned it. Non-user, if the owner of the right
has no reason to exercise it, requires something more than an immense length of time
of non-user. It is essential that it is proved to the court’s satisfaction that the owner of 
the legal right has abandoned the right – in the sense that he not only has not used it
but intends never to use it again. The onus lies fairly and squarely on those who 
assert that the right has been abandoned.34 
Similarly, in Tehidy Minerals Ltd. v Norman, Buckley LJ held that “[a]bandonment of an 
easement or of a profit à prendre can only, we think, be treated as having taken place where the
person entitled to it has demonstrated a fixed intention never at any time thereafter to assert the
30 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 54, quoting R v Sappier; R v Gray [2006] 2 SCR 686 at paras 48-49 
[Sappier/Gray]. Cited as well on the evolution of practices into modern forms are Van der Peet, supra note 3 at para.
64 and Mitchell v MNR, [2001] 1 SCR 911 at para 13 [Mitchell].
31 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 63.
32 Ibid. See also R v Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105 at paras 157-81, where Cromwell JA (later on the SCC), after
detailed discussion of relevant case law, concluded that Aboriginal title, once established at the time of Crown 
assertion of sovereignty, continues without any need to prove occupation from sovereignty to the present. This
decision was overturned on appeal without consideration of this issue because the SCC found, on the facts, that 
Aboriginal title had not been established: Marshall/Bernard, supra note 26.
33 But see the discriminatory and rightly criticized judgment of the High Court of Australia in Yorta Yorta
Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002), 194 ALR 538. See Richard Bartlett, “An Obsession with Traditional Laws
and Customs Creates Difficulty Establishing Native Title Claims in the South: Yorta Yorta” (2003) 31 Western 
Australia L Rev 35; Kirsten Anker, “Law in the Present Tense: Tradition and Cultural Continuity in Members of the
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria” (2004) 28 Melbourne U L Rev 1; Simon Young, The Trouble with 
Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Sydney: Federation Press, 2008), especially 317-34, 406-14.




      












   
   
   
   
  
     
    
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
 
        
 
       
   
  






        
    
right himself or to attempt to transmit it to anyone else.”35 Lord Denning MR, in Wyld v Silver, 
likewise rejected the notion that a customary right to hold a fair could be lost by non-user:
I know of no way in which the inhabitants of a parish can lose a right of this kind 
once they have acquired it except by Act of Parliament. Mere disuse will not do. And 
I do not see how they can waive it or abandon it. No one or more of the inhabitants
can waive or abandon it on behalf of the others. Nor can all the present inhabitants
waive or abandon it on behalf of future generations.36 
Lord Denning’s judgment is particularly relevant to Aboriginal rights because, like customary 
rights in England, they are held by groups rather than individuals for the benefit of future
generations as well as current members.37 What justification, one might ask, could there possibly 
be for treating the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada less favourably than 
customary rights are treated in England by the common law?
In Desautel, Justice Rowe observed that, “In effect, we are asked [by the Crown] to hold that an 
Aboriginal right can be lost or abandoned by non-use: a proposition that Lamer C.J. left
undecided in Van der Peet, at para. 63. Would accepting this proposition risk ‘undermining the
very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at
the hands of colonizers’?”38 He then stated that “It is better not to decide the issue here, as it does
not arise in light of the factual findings of the trial judge.”39 This was an odd thing for him to say, 
given that the evidence did not reveal any Sinixt hunting in Canada from 1930 to 2010, and that
the Crown argued that the right to hunt had been lost as a result. In effect, Justice Rowe did 
decide that non-user of the right for 80 years did not cause it to be lost.
Justice Rowe’s reference to Chief Justice Lamer’s statement in R v Côté that courts should avoid 
adopting propositions that would perpetuate historical injustice is significant. That statement was
made in the context of the Crown’s argument in Côté that French law in Canada prior to the
transfer of New France to Britain in 1763 did not acknowledge Aboriginal rights. The Supreme
Court decided that the Crown’s position, if correct,
… would create an awkward patchwork of constitutional protection for aboriginal
rights across the nation, depending upon the historical idiosyncrasies of colonization 
over particular regions of the country. In my respectful view, such a static and 
35 [1971] 2 QB 528 (CA) at 553. See also Ward v Ward (1852), 7 Ex 838 at 839; Gotobed v Pridmore (1970), 115 
Sol Jo 78 (CA).
36 [1963] 1 Ch 243 (CA) at 255-56. See also Scales v Key (1840), 11 Ad & E 819 (QB) at 825-26, where Lord 
Denman CJ observed that the jury’s finding, “that the custom had existed till 1689, was the same in effect as if they 
had found that it had existed till last week, unless something appeared to shew that it had been legally abolished.”
See also Heath v Deane, [1905] 2 Ch 86 at 93-94; New Windsor Corporation v Mellor, [1975] 3 All ER 44 (CA) at 
50-51 (Lord Denning MR), 53 (Browne LJ).
37 In Re Tucktoo and Kitchooalik (1972), 27 DLR (3d) 225 (NWTTC), affirmed Re Kitchooalik and Tucktoo (1972), 
28 DLR (3d) 483 (NWTCA), Morrow J held that the rule that customs can be abolished only by statute applies to 
Inuit customs relating to adoption, and that the legislation would have to be either repugnant to those customs, or
directly or by implication intended to abolish them.
38 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 64, quoting from R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139 at para 53 [Côté].






    
    
  
 
    
  
      
    









   
  
    
 
 
    
    
   
      
    







       
    
      
 
         
    
    
  
retrospective interpretation of s. 35(1) cannot be reconciled with the noble and 
prospective purpose of the constitutional entrenchment of aboriginal and treaty rights
in the Constitution Act, 1982. Indeed, the respondent’s proposed interpretation risks
undermining the very purpose of s. 35(1) by perpetuating the historical injustice
suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands of colonizers who failed to respect the
distinctive cultures of pre-existing aboriginal societies.40 
For the Sinixt, colonization had a series of negative impacts, starting with smallpox epidemics.41 
In 1846, the creation of the international boundary by the Oregon Boundary Treaty split their
ancestral territory in two. In 1896, the B.C. Game Protection Amendment Act made it unlawful
for them to hunt in British Columbia,42 so they would have had to do so surreptitiously. Justice
Rowe noted, “The trial judge did not find that the Sinixt were forced out of Canada ‘at gunpoint’
(para. 101), but nor did she find that the move was voluntary, as the Lakes Tribe never gave up 
their claim to their traditional territory in Canada.”43 The notion that any Indigenous people
would have voluntarily abandoned their homeland in the face of colonization strains credulity.44 
In case there was doubt on the issue before, the correct position on continuity is that sustained
use (or occupation in the case of Aboriginal title) is not required to maintain Aboriginal rights
based on practices, customs, and traditions at the time of contact (or Aboriginal title based on 
exclusive occupation at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty).45 If the Crown wants to 
allege the rights have subsequently been lost (other than by voluntary surrender by treaty), it has
to prove legislative extinguishment prior to enactment of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982.46 Extinguishment would require clear and plain legislation,47 just as extinguishment of 
customary and other legal rights in England requires unambiguous legislation.48 If the view of 
the dissenting judges had prevailed, on the other hand, sufficient informal interference with 
40 Côté, supra note 38 at para 53.
41 R v DeSautel, supra note 2 at paras 15-18.
42 SBC 1896, c 22, s 6: “It shall be unlawful for Indians not resident of this Province to kill game at any time of the
year.” See Desautel, supra note 11 at para 5.
43 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 5.
44 See ibid at para 33, quoted in text accompanying note 144 infra.
45 Where title generally is concerned, it is not lost by leaving land vacant for long periods of time or even 
indefinitely, provided an adverse possessor does not dispossess the owner, in which case the owner’s title is
extinguished by statute. At common law, it was even doubtful that title could be abandoned, because in that case an 
abeyance of seisin (possession entailing a title) would result, which the common law abhorred. As Pollock and 
Maitland wrote, “It seems very doubtful whether a man could (or can) get rid of a seisin once acquired, except by 
delivering seisin to some one else”: Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law
Before the Time of Edward I, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1898, reissued 1968), II, 54 n 2. See
also Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 63.
46 In Van der Peet, supra note 3 at para 28, Lamer C.J. said that “[s]ubsequent to s. 35(1) [of the Constitution Act,
1982] aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished and can only be regulated or infringed consistent with the
justificatory test laid out by this Court in Sparrow.” This was affirmed by McLachlin CJ in Mitchell, supra note 30
at para 11.
47 See R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1099 [Sparrow]; Gladstone, supra note 29 at paras 31-38; Delgamuukw, 
supra note 19 at para 180. 
48 Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. reissue (Butterworths: London, 1998), vol 12(1), para 646. For detailed 
discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial 








      
 
   
    
   
  
     
     
   
      
      





   
    
    
    
    
     
   
   
 
      
        
     
    
  
  
   
    
integral Indigenous practices “at the hands of colonizers”, though wholly insufficient as evidence
of extinguishment, probably would have doomed otherwise meritorious claims of Aboriginal
right derived from those practices.
Section 35(1) Rights and Common Law Aboriginal Rights
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 did not create Aboriginal rights; instead, it provided
constitutional protection to pre-existing rights by recognizing and affirming them.49 As Chief 
Justice Lamer affirmed in Van der Peet, “aboriginal rights existed and were recognized under the
common law.”50 In Desautel, the Crown argued that, “while Mr. Desautel cannot have a s. 
35(1) Aboriginal right, because he is not a member of an Aboriginal people of Canada, he can 
still have common law Aboriginal rights, albeit these rights would not constitute a defence to the
regulatory charges against him.”51 Justice Rowe, while not dismissing the possibility that some
Indigenous groups could have common law Aboriginal rights,52 said this would “introduce
additional difficulties” because, “[i]n particular, the Crown seems to assume that the test for a
common law Aboriginal right would be the same as the test for a s. 35(1) Aboriginal right, that
is, the Van der Peet test. But this is far from clear.”53 He went on to explain:
Before 1982, common law Aboriginal rights were recognized in Canada under 
British imperial law (Calder, at pp. 328 and 402; Mitchell, at paras. 62-64). Under 
the imperial doctrine of succession, when Britain took possession of a new territory, 
the laws in force in that territory were presumed to continue (subject to some
exceptions). This doctrine was not limited to practices, traditions or customs that
were “integral to the distinctive culture” of the Aboriginal people, as in Van der Peet. 
This suggests, on the one hand, that the test for a common law right may be met even 
where the Van der Peet test is not.54 
In other words, although pre-existing rights in Indigenous law became enforceable as common 
law rights after Crown assertion of sovereignty, not all those pre-existing rights would meet the
Van der Peet test for section 35(1) Aboriginal rights. That test sanctioned only rights based on 
practices, customs, and traditions integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures; not all common law
rights derived from pre-existing Indigenous law would be “integral” to distinctive Aboriginal
cultures in the sense understood by the Supreme Court. Moreover, to give rise to section 35(1) 
Aboriginal rights, the practices, customs, and traditions must have been integral at the time of 
49 Desautel, supra note 11 at paras 34 (Rowe J) and 139 (Côté J).
50 Van der Peet, supra note 3 at para 28, citing Calder v Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313.
51 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 67.
52 Ibid at paras 67-70. See also paras 139-40 (Côté J).
53 Ibid.at para 67.
54 Ibid at para 68. See also para 34, where Rowe J relied on an article by Mark Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of
Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 44 McGill LJ 711, 




   





   
  








    
   
 
 
    
   
    
 
  
      
  
 
     
 
 
      
     
   
 
   
   
 
 
    
     
European contact, not at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, which would be the time
when Indigenous law rights became enforceable at common law.55 
In Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer offered this explanation for limiting section 35(1) 
Aboriginal rights to integral practices, customs, and traditions:
The task of this Court is to define aboriginal rights in a manner which recognizes that
aboriginal rights are rights but which does so without losing sight of the fact that they 
are rights held by aboriginal people because they are aboriginal. The Court must
neither lose sight of the generalized constitutional status of what s. 35(1) protects, 
nor can it ignore the necessary specificity which comes from granting special
constitutional protection to one part of Canadian society.56 
Later in the judgment, the Chief Justice used reconciliation as a justification for limiting the
scope of constitutionally-protected Aboriginal rights:
In order to fulfil the purpose underlying s. 35(1) – i.e., the protection and 
reconciliation of the interests which arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of 
Europeans in North America aboriginal peoples lived on the land in distinctive
societies, with their own practices, customs and traditions – the test for identifying 
the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed at
identifying the crucial elements of those pre-existing distinctive societies. It must, in 
other words, aim at identifying the practices, traditions and customs central to the
aboriginal societies that existed in North America prior to contact with the
Europeans.57 
Under the Van der Peet test, section 35(1) protects only “crucial” or “central” aspects of 
Indigenous societies. Common law Aboriginal rights based on pre-existing Indigenous law that
are not regarded by the Court as sufficiently integral to Indigenous cultures would not meet the
test.
And yet in Delgamuukw, a year after Van der Peet, Chief Justice Lamer stated, in a passage
Justice Rowe cites in Desautel,58 that “[t]he existence of an aboriginal right at common law is … 
sufficient, but not necessary, for the recognition and affirmation of that right by s. 35(1).”59 This
55 These time periods can differ greatly in the same geographical area. For example, in R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR
101, French contact with the Mohawks at a location on the St. Lawrence River was held to have occurred in 1603 
with the arrival of Champlain, whereas the British acquired sovereignty via the Treaty of Paris, 1763.
56 Van der Peet, supra note 3 at para 20 (Lamer CJ’s underlining, our italics).
57 Ibid at para 44 (our italics). See also paras 55-57. In Gladstone, supra note 29, delivered the same day as Van der
Peet, Lamer CJ used reconciliation as an explanation for why constitutional Aboriginal rights can be infringed when 
that is justifiable: “Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies with the broader
political community of which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, where the objectives furthered by those
limits are of sufficient importance to the broader community as a whole, equally a necessary part of
that reconciliation” (para 73, Lamer CJ’s underlining). Note that in Sappier/Gray, supra note 30, the Court 
acknowledged that the integral test was being applied too rigidly in some cases and should be interpreted more
flexibly.
58 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 69.








     
    
 
     
     
      
   
  
   
   
 
   





     
   
      
 
   
  
        
     
     




   
     
 
       
 
 
    
suggests two things. First, section 35(1) probably includes Aboriginal rights that are not common 
law Aboriginal rights (this is “not necessary”), because section 35(1) rights can arise from
practices, whereas common law Aboriginal rights would need to be based on Indigenous law.60 
Lamer CJ acknowledged as much in Delgamuukw: “the common law should develop to 
recognize aboriginal rights (and title, when necessary) as they were recognized by either de
facto practice or by the aboriginal system of governance.”61 Second, because the existence of a
common law Aboriginal right is “sufficient” for section 35(1) recognition, rights established by 
proof of their pre-existence in Indigenous law should not need to meet the Van der Peet integral
requirement.62 
In Desautel, Justice Rowe acknowledged that there is “apparent tension” between common law
Aboriginal rights and the Van der Peet integral to the distinctive culture test, but, given his
conclusion that Mr. Desautel has a section 35(1) Aboriginal right under the Van der Peet test, he
found it unnecessary to say more about it.63 This leaves open the hopeful possibility that, in a
future case, the Court might accept that there are two sources of section 35(1) Aboriginal rights, 
namely, (1) practices, customs, and traditions integral to distinctive Aboriginal cultures at the
time of European contact (or exclusive occupation of land where Aboriginal title is concerned),
and (2) common law recognition of rights based on Indigenous law at the time of Crown 
assertion of sovereignty. Acknowledging the second source would provide constitutional
protection to Indigenous law rights that do not meet the Van der Peet integral test.64 As far as we
are aware, none of the section 35(1) cases decided by the Court so far precludes this possibility.65 
Aboriginal Title
Justices Rowe and Côté both acknowledged that interpreting “aboriginal peoples of Canada” in 
section 35(1) to include groups not resident in Canada could have consequences for Aboriginal
title claims. Justice Rowe decided that, given the differences between Aboriginal title and other 
Aboriginal rights and the fact that title was not at issue in Desautel, this matter could be left for 
another day.66 For Justice Côté, however, the matter raised serious concerns: “It would be a
60 See Kent McNeil & David Yarrow, “Has Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected 
Their Definition?” (2007) 37 Supreme Court L Rev (2nd) 177 at 210; Richard Ogden, “‘Existing’ Aboriginal Rights
in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (2009) 88 Can Bar Rev 51.
61 Delgamuukw, supra note 19 at para 159.
62 See McNeil & Yarrow, supra note 60 at 211.
63 Desautel, supra note 11 at paras 68-70. 
64 Recognition of common law Aboriginal rights and title could prove crucial in cases where Indigenous
communities seek to prove and enforce such rights against private, non-governmental parties. See, e.g., Saik’uz First 
Nation and Stellat’en First Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc, 2015 BCCA 154 (allowing the claim to proceed even 
without the Crown as a party), leave to appeal dismissed 15 October 2015, SCC File No 36480 (SCC); 
Newfoundland and Labrador (AG) v Uashaunnuat (Innu of Uashat and of Mani-Utenam), 2020 SCC 4 (confirming 
Quebec courts’ jurisdiction to hear and determine an Aboriginal title claim against a private company that also 
involves land in Labrador). The latter proceeding has been terminated by agreement without going to trial: see
online: https://www.riotinto.com/news/releases/2020/Uashat-mak-Mani-utenam-and-Matimekush-Lac-John-
communities-sign-reconciliation-and-collaboration-agreement-with-IOC.
65 In Delgamuukw, supra note 19 para 136, Lamer CJ said “none of the decisions of this Court handed down under s. 
35(1) in which the existence of an aboriginal right has been demonstrated has relied on the existence of that right at 
common law”, but that was in 1997.







   
   
    
   
    
    
   
     
  
    
    
    
      
      
    
   
    
    
        
  
     







   
  
 




   
  
 
    
    
remarkable proposition that a foreign group could hold constitutionally protected title to 
Canadian territory, as the required incidental mobility right would be fundamentally 
incompatible with Canadian sovereignty.”67 These concerns were another reason for her to 
conclude that the drafters of section 35(1) could not have intended “aboriginal peoples of 
Canada” to include groups not resident in Canada, such as Lakes Tribe of the Sinixt.68 
Justice Côté’s observation that Aboriginal title claims could potentially be brought by Indigenous
groups outside Canada is correct. As she pointed out, the Sinixt themselves have a title claim to 
their traditional territory in the Kootenay region of south central British Columbia. In Campbell v
British Columbia (Minister of Forests and Range),69 the directors of the Sinixt Nation Society, a
representative body of the Sinixt Nation, sought an interim injunction to stop logging in a portion 
of the Sinixt traditional territory in B.C., pending judicial review of a licence issued by the
province to a logging company. In 2008, two years before the licence was issued, representatives
of the Sinixt Nation had commenced legal action against British Columbia and Canada in which 
they claim Aboriginal title to their traditional territory in B.C. In Campbell, the petitioners
alleged breach of the Crown’s duty to consult the Sinixt Nation before issuing the logging
licence. The injunction petition was dismissed, mainly on the ground that the directors of the
Sinixt Nation Society lacked standing to bring it,70 but the case confirms that a Sinixt Aboriginal
title claim is at least in contemplation. No doubt other Indigenous groups now resident in the
United States whose traditional territories extend into Canada will also be considering whether to 
initiate Aboriginal title claims in light of the Desautel decision.
The question of the rights-bearing entity, an issue in Campbell that is present in Aboriginal rights
as well as title cases,71 did not arise in Desautel because Justice Rowe accepted the trial judge’s
factual findings that “the Sinixt had occupied territory in what is now British Columbia at the
time of European contact” and that “the Lakes Tribe were a modern successor of the Sinixt –
leaving open the possibility that there may be others…. The migration of the Lakes Tribe from
British Columbia to a different part of their traditional territory in Washington did not cause the
group to lose its identity or its status as a successor to the Sinixt.”72 Consequently, Justice Rowe 
concluded:
This case does not require the Court to set out criteria for successorship of Aboriginal
communities. This is a complex issue that should be dealt with on a fuller factual
record, with the benefit of legal argument. For example, consideration would have to 
67 Ibid at para 124, citing Mitchell, supra note 30, per Binnie J at paras 159-64. On Indigenous mobility rights more
generally, see John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2016), 19-49.
68 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 125. In reality, it is highly unlikely that the drafters and legislators gave any 
thought to the potential rights of Indigenous peoples whose territories extend into Canada but who were not resident
in Canada when section 35(1) was enacted in 1982.
69 2011 BCSC 448.
70 An appeal to the B.C. Court of Appeal was dismissed without considering the substantive issues. As the logging 
had already taken place, the court decided the injunction would serve no purpose: 2012 BCCA 274.
71 See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the Holders of Rights and 
Authority” (2020) 57(1) Osgoode Hall LJ 127 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance”].







    
  
     
 
  
     
   
  
     
   
 
     
    
 
 
    
 
    
  
  
    
 
  
     
   
 
    
 
    
         
   
  
    
  
 
      
    
    
be given to the possibility that a community may split over time, or, that two 
communities may merge into one, as well as to the relative significance of factors
such as ancestry, language, culture, law, political institutions and territory in 
connecting a modern community to its historical predecessor.73 
In Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia,74 the whole nation rather than individual bands was
held to have Aboriginal title, but that was based on evidence of the Tsilhqot’in government
structure and laws.75 In Desautel, Justice Rowe stated, “It is for Aboriginal peoples … to define
themselves and to choose by what means to make their decisions, according to their own laws, 
customs and practices.”76 Accordingly, the title-holding entity for the Sinixt would depend on 
their own laws. As not all Sinixt appear to be members of the Lakes Tribe,77 title might be vested 
in the Sinixt Nation as a whole, but again, that would depend on Sinixt law.78 
So what would an Indigenous group residing in the United States have to prove to have
Aboriginal title in Canada? As with regard to the Aboriginal hunting right at issue in Desautel, 
they would have to show they are the successors (or a successor) of an Indigenous group that
occupied territory in Canada. However, the time frame would be different: instead of proving 
their presence somewhere in Canada at the time of first contact with Europeans, they would have
to show they were there at the time of the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty (in B.C., 1846 
instead of 1811 for the Sinixt hunting right). The test for title is also different: instead of being 
based on a practice, custom, or tradition integral to their distinctive culture, it would be based on 
exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown sovereignty.79 
As mentioned previously, in her dissent Justice Côté expressed concern over the possibility that
Indigenous groups in the United States could have Aboriginal title in Canada, in particular 
because she thought that would require an “incidental mobility right [that] would be
fundamentally incompatible with Canadian sovereignty.”80 But why would Aboriginal title
necessitate an incidental right to enter Canada any more than the Aboriginal hunting right at
issue in Desautel would require a right of entry, which Mr. Desautel did not claim?81 Subject to 
73 Ibid at para 49.
74 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 29.
75 See William v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285 at paras 132-57. At para 149, Justice Groberman stated: “I 
agree with the trial judge’s conclusion that the definition of the proper rights holder is a matter to be determined 
primarily from the viewpoint of the Aboriginal collective itself.” On appeal to the SCC, the holding of the trial judge
and the BCCA that title is vested in the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole was not challenged: see McNeil, “Aboriginal 
Rights and Indigenous Governance”, supra note 71 at 136-41.
76 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 86.
77 See R v DeSautel, supra note 2 at paras 59-62. See also Desautel, supra note 11 at para 48, quoted in text
accompanying note 72 above.
78 The fact that the Lakes Tribe have an Aboriginal right to hunt in the traditional territory of the Sinixt Nation in 
B.C. would not prevent members of the Sinixt Nation who do not belong to that tribe from also having hunting 
rights there: see Delgamuukw, supra note 19 at para 159. However, because Aboriginal title is exclusive, unlike
other Aboriginal rights such as hunting rights, a declaration of title in favour of the Lakes Tribe rather than the
Sinixt Nation could exclude members of that nation who do not belong to the Lakes Tribe.
79 Delgamuukw, supra note 19; Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 29; Desautel, supra note 11 at para 80.
80 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 124.



























    
   
   
        




     
    
 
  







Canadian law, individuals who are not Canadian citizens can own land in Canada without this
necessitating a right of entry. However, if, as many have argued and we accept,82 Aboriginal title
includes governance authority, a declaration of title in favour of an Indigenous group resident in 
the United States could present complex jurisdictional issues. But comparable issues, such as the
extent of Indigenous governance authority and the application of federal and provincial laws on 
Aboriginal title lands, also arise where Aboriginal title is held by groups resident in Canada.83 
Moreover, Aboriginal rights apart from title, such as the Sinixt hunting right, could entail
governance rights, given their communal nature.84 These matters can and should be dealt with 
politically through the negotiation of treaties.85 
Duty to Consult
The Crown has an enforceable obligation to consult a given Indigenous community when it
contemplates conduct, or faces a decision, that, to its knowledge, might have an appreciable
adverse effect on a constitutionally protected treaty or Aboriginal right that the community has or 
credibly claims.86 Throughout the proceedings, and in its written submissions to the Supreme
Court of Canada, the Crown called attention to practical challenges it would face if Indigenous
groups located outside Canada were eligible to have or to claim such rights. “From a strictly 
quantitative perspective,” the Crown argued, conferring such eligibility on “US Indigenous
groups” “would dramatically increase the number of groups with whom the Crown may need to 
82 E.g. Jeremy Webber, “The Public Law Dimension of Indigenous Property Rights”, in Nigel Bankes & Timo 
Koivurova, eds., The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and International Dimensions of Indigenous
Property Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 79; Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Land Rights and Self-Government: 
Inseparable Entitlements” in Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse, eds., Between Indigenous and Settler Governance
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 135; Brian Slattery, “The Constitutional Dimensions of Aboriginal Title” (2015)
71 Supreme Court L Rev (2d) 45; Sari Graben & Christian Morey, “Aboriginal Title and Controlling Liberalization:
Use It Like the Crown” (2019) 52:2 UBC L Rev 435. For judicial acknowledgement of Indigenous nations’
governance authority over their Aboriginal title lands, see Campbell v British Columbia, [2000] 4 CNLR 1 (BCSC).
83 See Kerry Wilkins, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights” (1999) 22(1) Dalhousie LJ 185, and “Life Among the
Ruins: Section 91(24) After Tsilhqot’in and Grassy Narrows” (2017) 55(1) Alta L Rev 91; Kent McNeil, “The
Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments” (West Vancouver: National Centre for First Nations
Governance, 2007), online: https://wp74066.wpdns.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/kent_mcneil.pdf. One potential 
difference is that tribes in the United States have presumptive sovereign immunity from suit: see, e.g., Santa Clara 
Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49, 98 S.Ct 1670 at 58-59. Indigenous communities in Canada, even those with 
Aboriginal rights or title, do not. 
84 In An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC 2019, c 24, s 18(1), the
Parliament of Canada acknowledged that “The inherent right of self-government recognized and affirmed by section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 includes jurisdiction in relation to child and family services, including legislative
authority in relation to those services and authority to administer and enforce laws made under that legislative
authority.” A fortiori, judicially authenticated Aboriginal rights under section 35(1) should also entail governance
authority over those rights. Such rights, after all, belong at first instance to Indigenous collectives, not to individuals: 
see Sappier/Gray, supra note 30 at para 26.
85 See James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2007); Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2012); Joshua Ben David Nichols, A Reconciliation without Reflection: An 
Investigation into the Foundations of Aboriginal Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020).
86 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 [Haida]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v











   




    










     
    











     
   
   
     
    
consult and, where appropriate[,] accommodate.”87 “From a qualitative perspective,” it added, 
“requiring the Crown to consult, and where appropriate accommodate, US Indigenous groups is
likely to come with difficulties unforeseen by the Court in Haida, and unforeseeable even 
now.”88 One such difficulty that received attention during oral argument was the challenge of 
identifying Indigenous groups located outside Canada that might have Aboriginal rights in 
Canada.
The majority in Desautel addressed this last issue squarely. “Given the long history of Crown-
Aboriginal relations in Canada,” Justice Rowe said,
… the Crown will often be aware of the existence of Aboriginal groups within 
Canada and may have some sense of their claims. The situation is different when it
comes to Aboriginal groups outside of Canada. In the absence of some historical
interaction with them, the Crown may not know, or have any reason to know, that
they exist, let alone that they have potential rights within Canadian territory.
There is no freestanding duty on the Crown to seek out Aboriginal groups, 
including those outside Canada, in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge
of a potential impact on their rights. In the absence of such knowledge, the Crown is
free to act. It is for the groups involved to put the Crown on notice of their claims.89 
This is the clearest statement to date from the Court that the onus is on an Indigenous group to 
acquaint the Crown with its Aboriginal rights claims. In practice, it means that the Crown need 
not concern itself with Indigenous groups residing outside Canada (or, arguably, even within 
Canada) unless they have identified themselves and their claims to the Crown.
But “[o]nce the Crown is put on notice, … it has to determine whether a duty to consult arises
and, if so, what the scope of the duty is.”90 Ordinarily, “the scope of the duty [to consult] is
proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of 
the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title
claimed.”91 In practice, the latter of these criteria – the seriousness of the potentially adverse
effect – has been the more important. In Desautel, the Court allowed that “the duty to consult
may well operate differently as regards those outside Canada,”92 because “groups outside Canada
are not implicated … to the same degree” in the “‘process of fair dealing and reconciliation’ 
which ‘arises … from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty’.”93 By way of example, it suggested
that “[i]ntegrating groups outside Canada into consultations by the Crown with groups inside
87 Factum of the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen, 22 November 2019, https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-
DocumentsWeb/38734/FM010_Appellant_Her-Majesty-the-Queen.pdf [Appellant’s Factum], at para 92.
88 Ibid at para 93. See also Factum of the Intervener, Attorney General of Ontario, 12 May 2020, https://www.scc-
csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38734/FM070_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-Ontario.pdf, at para 31:
“the cross-border realities may create uncertainty for governments as to how to fulfill their [consultation]
obligations”.
89 Desautel, supra note 11 at paras 74-75.
90 Ibid at para 76.
91 Haida, supra note 86 at para 39.
92 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 73.














   
  





   
  
 
    
  
  
   
  
     
 
 
   
  
       
   
     
      
     
   
    
     
  
  
      
   
Canada may involve discussions within Aboriginal communities and with the Crown.”94 But
such challenges, Rowe J insisted, are not sufficient reason for defeating or denying claims of 
Aboriginal right that are otherwise meritorious.95 Here too, we must await a subsequent case for 
elaboration.
Sovereign Incompatibility
As mentioned above, the Crown (in right of B.C.), throughout the Desautel litigation, argued that
the Lakes Tribe couldn’t possibly have Aboriginal rights in B.C., because any such rights would 
be incompatible with the (federal) Crown’s power, as sovereign, to control its international
borders. No pre-existing practices, customs, and traditions deemed incompatible with the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, the Crown argued, could have survived post-sovereignty to 
anchor present-day Aboriginal rights.96 “Taken in isolation,” the Crown acknowledged, “the
Aboriginal right to hunt claimed by Mr. Desautel is not incompatible with the Crown’s assertion 
of sovereignty.”97 But any meaningful exercise of such a right, it argued, would require Lakes
Tribe members to cross the international border. And “[a]n aboriginal right, once established, 
generally encompasses other rights necessary to its meaningful exercise.”98 An Aboriginal right
to cross the international border is, in the Crown’s submission, incompatible with the (federal) 
Crown’s sovereignty, because “[c]ontrol over the mobility of persons and goods into one country 
is, and always has been, a fundamental attribute of sovereignty.”99 As the majority judgment in 
Desautel notes,100 this submission received support from the attorneys general of Quebec, New
Brunswick, and Alberta. Justice Côté, dissenting in Desautel, appears to have accepted it.101 
There is, at first blush, something disconcerting about this argument. The notion that nominate
rights encompass incidental rights arose in response to Indigenous parties’ (successful) efforts to 
broaden the constitutionally protected scope of the treaty102 or Aboriginal103 rights they had or 
were asserting. Here, on the other hand, the Crown was attempting to embed a poison pill within 
a claim of right that did not purport to include it. But the Supreme Court has taken liberties
before when characterizing communities’ claims of Aboriginal right;104 in Mitchell, most
particularly, it had insisted, over Grand Chief Mitchell’s objections, that the right he claimed –
an Aboriginal right to bring goods for trade across what by then had become an international
border – entailed a (redundant) incidental right to cross that border.105 This was the precedent the
Crown sought to invoke in Desautel.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Appellant’s Factum, supra note 87 at para 45; see also Mitchell, supra note 30 at para 10.
97 Appellant’s Factum, ibid at para. 46.
98 Ibid., quoting with approval Mitchell, supra note 30 at para 22.
99 Ibid at para 48, quoting with approval Mitchell, supra note 30 at para 160, Binnie J (concurring in the result).
100 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 65.
101 Ibid at para 124.
102 See Simon v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 387 at 403; R v Sundown, [1999] 1 SCR 393 at para 33.
103 Côté, supra note 38 at para 57.
104 For discussion, see Kerry Wilkins, “Whose Claim Is It, Anyway? Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (AG)” 
(2013) 11 Indigenous LJ 73.
105 See Mitchell, supra note 30 at para 22. The Court considered and rejected (ibid) Grand Chief Mitchell’s argument














   
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
 









    
   
 
 
   
 




   
The majority in Desautel declined this invitation. “I am of the view,” Justice Rowe said,
… that, unlike the right claimed in Mitchell, the very purpose of the right claimed by 
Mr. Desautel is not to cross the border. The mobility right, if it exists, is incidental in 
this case. Sovereign incompatibility would relate solely to the issue of whether there
can be an Aboriginal right to enter Canada – an issue that is not raised here, because
Mr. Desautel was not denied entry into Canada. Moreover, this issue was not fully 
addressed by the courts below. Therefore, the question of whether the appropriate
framework is sovereign incompatibility or infringement/justification under Sparrow
should be left for another day, when the Court has a proper set of facts to answer the
question.106 
In retrospect, it would have been easy to establish, one way or the other, whether the Aboriginal
right Mr. Desautel claimed on behalf of the Lakes Tribe includes an incidental right to cross the
international border. All it would have taken was to ask Mr. Desautel or his counsel whether 
refusing him entry into Canada would infringe the Aboriginal right he was claiming. If the
answer were yes, then the Lakes Tribe’s claim of right would have included, necessarily, a claim
to an incidental right to cross the border. To all appearances, no one posed that question.
Suppose for now, then, that the Crown (in right of B.C.) is correct in its assertion that any 
Aboriginal right the Lakes Tribe members have to hunt in B.C. includes an Aboriginal right to 
cross the international border. What consequences ensue from that supposition?
To answer that question, we shall need criteria for use in deciding whether any given interest, 
right or legal arrangement is compatible with the sovereignty of the Crown. That inquiry is
beyond the scope of the present discussion. Relevant surely to it, though, is the view of the
(federal) Crown, whose sovereignty the Lakes Tribe’s claim is said to have put at risk. Can 
something be incompatible with the sovereignty of the Crown if the (federal) Crown itself 
perceives no incompatibility?
As it happened, that was the situation in Desautel. In his written argument to the Supreme Court
of Canada, the Attorney General of Canada did not oppose Mr. Desautel’s claim on the basis of 
sovereign incompatibility; he was content to defer the issue for consideration in a case where
someone was refused entry at the border.107 Were such a case to arise, Canada continued, the
analysis should acknowledge that “Canada has, by its Constitution, limited the exercise of 
government powers which may be inherent as a sovereign state. Section 35 [of the Constitution 
Act, 1982] is one such limit; the Charter is another. Canadian authorities are subject to these self-
imposed limitations on what would otherwise be an incident of sovereign power.”108 Where
imposition of federal border control precludes someone from exercising her community’s
the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 4, guaranteed independently his constitutional right, as a citizen of Canada, to 
enter and leave Canada.
106 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 66 (emphasis in original).
107 Factum of the Attorney General of Canada, 27 May 2020, https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-
DocumentsWeb/38734/FM080_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-Canada.pdf [Federal Factum], at para 50. See
generally ibid at paras 50-53.





   














    
  
   




   
   
 
 
     
 
   
 
        
   
      
   
  
 
    
 
 
Aboriginal right, “the framework to determine such matters generally lies in the law of 
infringement and justification under the Sparrow framework.”109 Where infringement results, 
“such infringement should be reviewed pursuant to the Sparrow framework. The outcome will
depend on the evidence in each case.”110 In Canada’s view, therefore, Mr. Desautel’s claim of 
Aboriginal right, even if successful, posed no challenges that the ordinary Canadian 
constitutional framework could not address in the ordinary way. 
In response, the Crown (in right of B.C.) might challenge the relevance here of the “self-imposed 
limitation” on Crown sovereignty that Canada says section 35 represents. Pre-existing rights
deemed incompatible with Crown sovereignty, B.C. might argue, did not survive the Crown’s
assertion of sovereignty and so cannot exist as rights cognizable in Canadian law. Consequently, 
no such putative Aboriginal rights can qualify as “existing” Aboriginal rights eligible for 
protection under section 35.
Regardless of the merits of such an argument more generally, it has no application on the facts of 
Desautel. It was, after all, precisely because “the Sinixt had occupied territory in what is now
British Columbia at the time of European contact” and “the Lakes Tribe were a modern 
successor of the Sinixt” that the Lakes Tribe qualified as “aboriginal peoples of Canada” for 
purposes of section 35;111 it was because hunting in traditional Sinixt territory in what is now 
B.C. was integral to the ancestral Sinixt way of life at the moment of contact that the Lakes Tribe
could establish a contemporary Aboriginal right to resume hunting there.112 At the time the
Crown asserted sovereignty over what is now B.C. and agreed on the international border with 
the United States in 1846, Sinixt were still there in significant numbers, engaging in the practice
that constituted the Aboriginal right. Those Sinixt had no need to cross an international border to 
exercise their hunting right. Only those of their descendants who became the Lakes Tribe found 
it necessary subsequently to do so. Whatever else we say about sovereign incompatibility, 
therefore, the Aboriginal right to hunt in the part of traditional Sinixt territory that became B.C.
survived the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty because, at the time the Crown asserted 
sovereignty there, neither the right nor its exercise implicated the international border. These are
conclusions the Desautel majority could have reached on the facts as found by the trial judge.
Choice of Proceedings
Desautel was a prosecution about regulatory offences. As a result, the only parties with standing 
to give evidence at the trial were the Crown (in right of B.C.), seeking enforcement of the
offence provisions, and Mr. Desautel, claiming in defence the benefit of the Aboriginal right.113 
Others with potential interests in the fate of the Aboriginal right claim Mr. Desautel asserted – in 
109 Federal Factum, supra note 107 at para 54, citing with approval Mitchell, supra note 30 at para 63. 
110 Federal Factum, ibid at para 55.
111 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 48; see also ibid at para 47.
112 Ibid at para 62.
113 Because Mr. Desautel challenged the constitutional applicability of the offence provisions, section 8 of the
Constitutional Question Act, RSBC 1996, c 68, entitled the Attorney General of Canada to receive notice of the
constitutional question and to make submissions to the trial court, and to any subsequent B.C. appellate courts, about





   
     
  
   
 
   
  
 
























       
     
 
 
   
    
particular, Indigenous communities resident in B.C. that included Sinixt descendants114 and the
B.C. Métis115 – had no opportunity to lead evidence they considered relevant to the issue of 
Aboriginal rights in respect of traditional Sinixt territory in southern British Columbia. Groups
representing those interests intervened at the Supreme Court of Canada in the Desautel appeal
and asked specifically that the court reach no conclusions that could prejudice claims of 
Aboriginal right that they might assert.116 
The majority judgment in Desautel obliged,117 but took the opportunity to comment critically on 
the limitations endemic to regulatory prosecutions. “[T]he defence of a prosecution for a
provincial regulatory offence,” Justice Rowe said at the outset of his judgment, “while it may 
serve as a test case (as here), is not well suited to deal with such broader issues [as what Mr. 
Desautel’s success means for the exercise of rights protected under s 35(1)]. Such issues are
better dealt with in an action setting out the right claimed, with a full evidentiary record, and 
seeking declaratory relief.”118 Subsequently, he added this:
When parties are considering possible courses of action, it is useful to bear in mind 
that criminal and regulatory proceedings have inherent limits proper to their nature. 
In these types of cases, the evidence administered at trial is generally less extensive
and the rules are different than in a reference or a declaratory action.… As LeBel J. 
stressed in his concurring reasons in Marshall,[119] at para. 142:
Although many of the aboriginal rights cases that have made their way to this
Court began by way of summary conviction proceedings, it is clear to me that we
should re-think the appropriateness of litigating aboriginal treaty, rights and title
issues in the context of criminal trials. The issues that are determined in the
context of these cases have little to do with the criminality of the accused’s
conduct; rather, the claims would properly be the subject of civil actions for 
declarations. Procedural and evidentiary difficulties, inherent in adjudicating 
aboriginal claims arise not only out of the rules of evidence, the interpretation of 
evidence and the impact of the relevant evidentiary burdens, but also out of the
scope of appellate review of the trial judge’s findings of fact. These claims may 
also impact on the competing rights and interests of a number of parties who may 
have a right to be heard at all stages of the process. In addition, special difficulties
114 See Factum of the Intervener, Okanagan Nation Alliance, 19 June 2020, https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-
DocumentsWeb/38734/FM120_Intervener_Okanagan-Nation-Alliance.pdf [ONA Factum], paras 1-7.
115 See Factum of the Intervener, Métis Nation British Columbia, 28 July 2020, https://www.scc-
csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/38734/FM230_Intervener_Métis-Nation-British-Columbia.pdf [MNBC
Factum], especially at paras 7-8.
116 See ONA Factum, supra note 114, paras 3, 22-28, 31; MNBC Factum, supra note 115, paras 10-27.
117 See Desautel, supra note 11 at paras 32 and 47 (deferring consideration of implications for Métis), 49 (declining 
to “set out criteria for successorship of Aboriginal communities”), 56-60 (rejecting Canada’s submission that only 
those non-resident Indigenous individuals eligible to “shelter” under the section 35 rights of Indigenous
communities resident in Canada could benefit from such rights), 80-82 (deferring discussion of Aboriginal title and 
modern treaty issues).
118 Ibid at para 2.




   
   
 
  







   
  
   
  
   
 





     
    
     








   
  
   
  
      
 
come up when dealing with broad title and treaty rights claims that involve
geographic areas extending beyond the specific sites relating to the criminal
charges.120 
This is not the first time (even apart from Marshall/Bernard) that the Court has preferred civil
proceedings to regulatory prosecutions for the purpose of resolving claims of Aboriginal right or 
title. It did so first in Sparrow,121 then again by implication in Marshall 2,122 then again, more
explicitly, in Lax Kw’alaams.123 Why is it, then, that regulatory prosecutions continue so often to 
be the vehicle of choice for Indigenous individuals or communities seeking authentication of 
treaty or Aboriginal rights? Two reasons come to mind.
In the first place, the courts have restricted litigants’ access to civil proceedings as a means of 
proving claims of Aboriginal right. The Supreme Court itself has precluded outright
consideration on the merits of such claims in judicial review proceedings,124 and the BC Court of 
Appeal has held that actions for declarations of Aboriginal right or title are not justiciable in the
absence of some allegation of “violation of or threat to” the right being claimed.125 (Never mind 
that we all have some interest in knowing what Aboriginal rights there are, and to whom they 
pertain.) On this view, a claim of infringement is the price of admission if an Indigenous group 
wants to use civil proceedings to prove its claim of Aboriginal right, so the Indigenous claimant
had better come up with one.126 Contravening an offence provision believed to infringe the
asserted right is one of the surer ways to equip oneself with a claim of infringement.
The second reason is the one Mark Underhill, lead counsel for Mr. Desautel, gave when asked 
about this question a few weeks before the Desautel decision came out, at a panel discussion 
about the case organized for students at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. His answer is
revealing. Civil proceedings involving claims of Aboriginal right, he suggested, take much too 
long and cost much too much to be practicable options for Indigenous communities that have
limited means and urgent needs. In an imperfect world, test case prosecutions are often the most
120 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 90. Emphasis in embedded quotation added in Desautel. For discussion of this
issue in Marshall/Bernard, supra note 26, see Shin Imai, “The Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment
and an Elaboration on a Proposal by Justice Lebel” (2006) 55 UNBLJ 146.
121 See Sparrow, supra note 47 at 1095: “the trial for a violation of a penal prohibition may not be the most 
appropriate setting in which to determine the existence of an aboriginal right”.
122 R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533 [Marshall 2] at para 13.
123 Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 56 [Lax Kw’alaams] at para 11: “The
courts (including this Court) have long urged the negotiation of Aboriginal and treaty claims. If litigation becomes
necessary, however, we have also said that such complex issues would be better sorted out in civil actions for
declaratory relief rather than within the confines of regulatory proceedings. In a fisheries prosecution, for example, 
there are no pleadings, no pre-trial discovery, and few of the procedural advantages afforded by the civil rules of
practice to facilitate a full hearing of all relevant issues.”
124 Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54 at para 84.
125 Cheslatta Carrier Nation v British Columbia, 2000 BCCA 539 [Cheslatta Carrier] at para 15, leave to appeal 
refused [2000] SCCA No 625; see generally ibid at paras 13-19; Kaska Dena Council v British Columbia (Attorney
General), 2008 BCCA 455 at paras 11-15.
126 See Cheslatta Carrier, supra note 125 at para 19: “the definition of the circumstances in which infringement is


















   





    
  




     
   
      
  
     
   
     




   
  
    
cost-effective means of obtaining timely, authoritative determinations of controversial claims of 
Aboriginal right. 
There’s a paradox here. The very features of civil proceedings that make them more attractive to 
the Supreme Court for adjudication of complex Aboriginal rights claims make such proceedings
less attractive to many of the Indigenous communities in a position to assert such claims
credibly. That in itself might give one pause, but it has potential, as well, to affect the prospects
for negotiated resolution of the meritorious claims.
“Negotiation,” the majority judgment reiterated in Desautel, “has significant advantages for both 
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples as a way to obtain clarity about Aboriginal rights”;127 “[t]rue
resolution is rarely, if ever, achieved in courtrooms.”128 But channeling Aboriginal rights
litigation into forms of proceedings typically beyond the means of the Indigenous claimants
reduces their bargaining power in any negotiations. Where litigation isn’t a meaningful option if 
negotiations go poorly, the Indigenous parties may well feel they have little choice but to accept
what the Crown may offer them. The Crown, perceiving all this, may have little, if any, incentive
to take part in negotiations, except perhaps as required by the honour of the Crown and the still
undefined, unenforced, inchoate duty to negotiate that the honour of the Crown is said to 
impose.129 Private litigants, against whom Indigenous communities seek to establish and enforce
Aboriginal rights,130 of course, have no such obligation to negotiate.
Indigenous communities of limited means do have at least one option under current law when 
contemplating civil proceedings to establish and enforce Aboriginal rights. Superior courts, the
Supreme Court of Canada has held, have the option in some circumstances of awarding interim
costs to a party, irrespective of the eventual outcome, to facilitate the party’s full participation in 
the proceedings.131 Indigenous parties using civil proceedings to advance their claims have
benefited from interim costs orders in the Okanagan132 and Tsilhqot’in133 actions, both of which 
have involved assertions of Aboriginal title, and in Grassy Narrows,134 a case about treaty 
interpretation.
127 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 87.
128 Ibid, quoting with approval Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 at para 24.
129 See Haida, supra note 86 at para 25; Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 
at para 73; Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at paras 54, 56; Desautel,
supra note 11 at paras 88-89. For discussion, see Felix Hoehn, “The Duty to Negotiate and the Ethos of
Reconciliation” (2020) 83(1) Sask L Rev 1.
130 See supra note 64.
131 See British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71 [Okanagan] at para 35: “The
power to order interim costs is inherent in the nature of the equitable jurisdiction as to costs, in the exercise of which 
the court may determine at its discretion when and by whom costs are to be paid. This broad discretion may be
expressly referred to in a statute.… Indeed, the power to order interim costs may be specifically stipulated.… Even 
absent explicit statutory authorization, however, the power to award interim costs is implicit in courts’ jurisdiction 
over costs as it is set out in statutes”.
132 Ibid at paras 45-47.
133 William v British Columbia, 2013 BCCA 1 [William].




    
    

















       
   






   
 









   
   
     
But there are, to put it very conservatively, no guarantees. The Supreme Court in Okanagan set
out three conditions a litigant must meet even to be eligible for an interim costs order. They are
not meant to be easy to satisfy. 
The first requirement is that “[t]he party seeking costs genuinely cannot afford to pay for the
litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the issues to trial.”135 This, according 
to the majority in Little Sisters, requires that the applicant for interim costs
… explore all other possible funding options. These include, but are not limited to, 
public funding options like legal aid and other programs designed to assist various
groups in taking legal action. An advance costs award is neither a substitute for, nor a
supplement to, these programs. An applicant must also be able to demonstrate that an 
attempt, albeit unsuccessful, has been made to obtain private funding through 
fundraising campaigns, loan applications, contingency fee agreements and any other 
available options.136 
In the view of the Alberta Court of Appeal, a First Nation applicant must, in addition, devote
such resources as it has to funding the litigation, even if that means leaving unaddressed 
“legitimate and reasonable ‘pressing infrastructural and social needs’” within the community.137 
Other lower court jurisprudence suggests that litigants who initiate proceedings (including, for 
instance, Indigenous plaintiffs seeking declarations of Aboriginal right) may find it more
difficult to satisfy this requirement than those “thrust into a situation requiring litigation”138 
(individuals facing, for instance, prosecution).
The second requirement is that the claim be “prima facie meritorious; that is, the claim [be] at
least of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the interests of justice for the opportunity to pursue
the case to be forfeited just because the litigant lacks financial means.”139 According to Little
Sisters, this test
… requires something more than mere proof that one’s case has sufficient merit not
to be dismissed summarily. Rather, an applicant must prove that the interests of 
justice would not be served if a lack of resources made it necessary to abort the
litigation. The very wording of the requirement confirms that the interests of justice
will not be jeopardized every time a litigant is forced to withdraw from litigation for 
135 Okanagan, supra note 131 at para 40.
136 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Commissioner of Customs and Revenue), 2007 SCC 2 [Little
Sisters] at para 40.
137 Anderson v Alberta (Attorney General), 2020 ABCA 238 at para 26. “The test is not met,” the court added ibid, 
“if the applicant has funds, but chooses or prefers to spend the funds on other priorities, regardless of how
reasonable those other priorities may be.” See also ibid at paras 27-28 (distinguishing such reasonable expenditures
from “basic necessities”). On January 21, 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal this decision 
(Docket No 39323). The hearing is scheduled for November 4, 2021: see https://www.scc-csc.ca/case-
dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=39323. 
138 See Pasqua First Nation v Canada, 2017 FC 655 [Pasqua] at para 29, citing with approval Little Sisters, supra
note 136 at para 59.
























    
  
  







     
     
   
     
     
        
    
   
  
financial reasons. The reason for this is that the context in which merit is considered 
is conditioned by the need to show that the case is exceptional.140 
Finally, “the issues raised” in the litigation must “transcend the individual interests of the
particular litigant, [be] of public importance, and [not have] been resolved in previous cases.”141 
To satisfy this expectation, the applicant for interim costs must meet each of its three component
requirements.142 “This means that a litigant whose case, however compelling it might be, is of 
interest only to the litigant will be denied an advance costs award. It does not mean, however, 
that every case of interest to the public will satisfy the test.”143 
As mentioned, some Indigenous communities have met these criteria and obtained orders of 
interim costs to help finance litigation of their section 35 claims in civil courts. But few
Indigenous communities contemplating civil proceedings can have confidence that courts will
find their circumstances satisfy these requirements. And to be clear,
[t]hese are necessary conditions that must be met for an award of interim costs to be
available in cases of this type. The fact that they are met in a particular case is not
necessarily sufficient to establish that such an award should be made; that
determination is in the discretion of the court. If all three conditions are satisfied, 
courts have a narrow jurisdiction to order that the impecunious party’s costs be paid 
prospectively. Such orders should be carefully fashioned and reviewed over the
course of the proceedings to ensure that concerns about access to justice are balanced 
against the need to encourage the reasonable and efficient conduct of litigation.144 
Put differently, the Indigenous claimant may well be unsuccessful in obtaining interim costs even 
if it has satisfied all three of the eligibility conditions. “It is only a ‘rare and exceptional’ case
that is special enough to warrant an advance costs award.”145 And even then, it will be
prospective only; it will not cover those costs the Indigenous litigant has already incurred prior to 
the interim costs award.146 
In brief, both the doctrinal impediments and the financial risks of civil litigation are substantial, 
and the prospects of relief from the latter by means of interim costs awards guarded, for 
Indigenous communities with limited means but potentially meritorious claims of Aboriginal
right.147 While this remains so, such communities have reason to continue provoking regulatory 
prosecutions to test their claims of Aboriginal or treaty right, despite the evident disadvantages
such proceedings have for that purpose when compared with full-dress civil proceedings. If the
Supreme Court of Canada is serious about preferring civil proceedings to prosecutions for this
140 Little Sisters, supra note 136 at para. 51.
141 Okanagan, supra note 131 at para 40.
142 See R v Caron, 2011 SCC 5 at para 44.
143 Little Sisters, supra note 136 at para 39.
144 Okanagan, supra note 131 at para 41.
145 Little Sisters, supra note 136 at para 38, quoting with approval Okanagan, supra note 131 at para 1.
146 Pasqua, supra note 138 at para 28, quoting with approval Joseph v Canada, 2008 FC 574 at para 27. See also 
quotation supra at note 144. 





   
 
      
   




   
       







    
   
 
 









    
 
     
     
   
    
purpose, it is going to have to acknowledge and address this predicament. It will have a chance
to do so late in 2021 in a First Nation’s advance costs appeal.148 
Conclusion
The Desautel case decided a major issue: that Indigenous groups who are not resident in Canada
can have constitutionally-protected Aboriginal rights if they had traditional territory here prior to 
contact with Europeans. The decision also reaffirmed that Aboriginal rights are not lost as a
result of long periods of non-user, especially if that was a result of colonial displacement, as it
almost always would be. Britain and the United States drew boundaries in North America that
disregarded entirely the existence of Indigenous nations such as the Sinixt, whose territories were
severed in the process. Indigenous peoples were absorbed into the nation-states of Canada and 
the United States and made unwelcome in their traditional territories on the other side of the
border, causing them to be separated from some of their lands and relations. Justice Smith, in her 
unanimous decision for the British Columbia Court of Appeal, saw the injustice in this:
Imposing a requirement that Indigenous peoples may only hold Aboriginal rights in 
Canada if they occupy the same geographical area in which their ancestors exercised 
those rights, ignores the Aboriginal perspective, the realities of colonization and does
little towards achieving the ultimate goal of reconciliation. In this case, such a
requirement would extinguish Mr. Desautel’s right to hunt in the traditional territory 
of his ancestors even though the rights of his community in that geographical area
were never voluntarily surrendered, abandoned or extinguished.149 
In his majority Supreme Court decision, Justice Rowe likewise took account of the fact that
the “displacement of Aboriginal peoples as a result of colonization is well acknowledged” by
quoting the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:
Aboriginal peoples were displaced physically – they were denied access to their 
traditional territories and in many cases actually forced to move to new locations
selected for them by colonial authorities. They were also displaced socially and 
culturally, subject to intensive missionary activity and the establishment of schools –
which undermined their ability to pass on traditional values to their children, 
imposed male-oriented Victorian values, and attacked traditional activities such as
significant dances and other ceremonies. In North America they were also displaced 
politically, forced by colonial laws to abandon or at least disguise traditional
governing structures and processes in favour of colonial-style municipal
institutions.150 
Acknowledgement of these realities by the courts is a significant step towards reconciliation.
148 See supra note 137.
149 Desautel (BCCA), supra note 10 at para 62.
150 Desautel, supra note 11 at para 33, quoting Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
vol 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996),139-40.
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